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Crime is an issue that involves the whole community.  
Crime is the result of complex changes in economic, social and cultural factors such as 
unemployment, dysfunctional families, child abuse, poor education, community 
breakdown economic inequality and substance abuse.  When we raise the topic of 
crime and justice, people think of a wide range of things – murder and murderers, guns 
and knives, drug traffickers and addicts, juvenile delinquents, violence in videos and 
on the screen, alcohol and crime, while collar crime, tax evasion, money-laundering, 
organised crime, domestic violence, environmental crime, child abuse – the list goes 
on. 
Compared to many countries, Australia is a reasonably safe place.  Most Australians 
can go about their daily lives with little chance of their becoming the target of a 
criminal attack.  But it does happen – and the prospect that it might happen worries a 
lot of people.  And, although, most of Australia is comparatively safe, the incidence of 
crime now is much greater than it was twenty years ago.  Criminal activity hurts and 
outrages people, and costs the community billions of dollars. 
Some crimes have gone up, others have diminished  -  there is no consistent pattern.  
In the past year, assault has gone up by about 4%, sexual assault by about 5%, robbery 
has fallen by about 20%, burglary has fallen by about 10% and motor vehicle theft has 
fallen by about 20%.  In earlier years all of these have risen a bit and fallen a bit.  
Homicide is at its lowest level for a decade, and the rate has remained unchanged for a 
century. 
The one crime that keeps going up and up and up is fraud.  However, our data on 
fraud is not as good as the data on other crimes, as so much is not reported to police, 
and a lot of victims don’t know that they have been defrauded, and others still are 
happy to sweep it under the carpet, or pretend it didn’t happen. 
Fraud involves the use of dishonest or deceitful conduct in order to obtain some unjust 
advantage over someone else  
It has been around for as long as people have been around  -  somebody trying to con 
somebody else, to offer them an unbelievable and unattainable deal, or to work the 
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system unlawfully to their own advantage so that things come incredibly easily.  
While crimes of deception are well-established in history,  technological, social, 
demographic and economic developments have brought about changes in the form 
fraud takes and how it is perpetrated. 
 
Fraud currently costs the community around $6 billion p.a, and last year alone cost the 
Commonwealth Government around $200 million. 
 
The prevention and control of fraud are two of the great challenges for Australia now, 
and in years to come. 
 
The risks of fraud are everywhere.  The circumstances in which fraud can exist are 
enormously diverse.  Some of the types include: commercial fraud, fraud against 
governments, consumer fraud, migration fraud, securities fraud, superannuation fraud, 
intellectual property fraud, computer and telecommunications fraud, insurance fraud, 
plastic card fraud, art fraud, charitable contribution fraud,  identity-related fraud, 
advance fee fraud, health care fraud, the list goes on and on, and new opportunities for 
deceptive conduct arise all the time.   
 
The basic motivation for fraud is greed, a fairly robust and enduring human 
characteristic.  We are unlikely to eliminate greed in my lifetime or yours, so 
countermeasures have to be more than psychological or feelgood tactics. 
 
Crime follows opportunity, and opportunities for fraud flow from economic growth.  
The more commerce there is, the more opportunities there are to commit fraud.  
Nobody wants to pull the plug on electronic commerce,  close down the stock market, 
or the health insurance system, just because they may be vulnerable to fraud. 
 
Rather, the challenge lies in designing systems which allow commerce to flourish 
while blocking opportunities for fraud.  This challenges us to extend our ingenuity to 
counter that of villains, and to build smart systems. 
 
Like all crimes, fraud is the product of 3 factors 
 
• Motivation -  somebody willing to offend 
• The presence of a prospective victim or target 
• The absence of a capable guardian 
 
This general rule applies whether we are referring to fraud against a government 
benefits program, fraud against elderly people, fraud against your agency, or 
misappropriation of corporate assets by a company Director. 
 
Three ways to work on the limitation of fraud involve:  
• Reducing the supply of motivated offenders 
• Protecting and educating the suitable targets 
• Limiting opportunities by making the crime more difficult to commit 
 
New technologies make it a lot harder to identify and prevent different types of fraud.  
These same technologies that have provided so many benefits have, however, created 
enormous opportunities for offenders— 
Adam Graycar    Risk & Crime  ARIMA March 17 2004 
S:\PS-LIB - CCRS\Graycar speeches\5 graycar speeches 2004 - 2007 Cabinet Office\04-03 ARIMA 
Adelaide\ARIMA speech March 2004 .doc  Page 3 of 10 
 
Criminals are able: 
• to communicate with each other in secret, 
• to disguise their identities in order to avoid detection, and 
• to manipulate electronic payment systems to obtain funds illegally. 
 
They are also able to perpetrate fraud on a much wider scale than in the past, 
duplicating countless fraudulent invoices, or establishing large numbers of accounts 
that only exist in cyberspace.  Their victims may also be located anywhere in the 
world. 
 
In my previous life we did a lot of analysis of frauds such as Telecommunications 
Crime, On-line Share market Manipulation, money laundering, Electronic Funds 
Transfer Crime, Identity-Related Crime.  Let me share some Identity-Related fraud 
issues with you. 
 
Identity-Related Crime 
In the old days bushrangers and outlaws used masks to cover their faces so nobody 
would know who they are.  Today, on the internet, nobody really knows who you are. 
 
One of the most frequently used strategies to perpetrate crime is the creation of false 
documents used to misrepresent one’s identity.  Once a convincing identity has been 
fraudulently established, it is then possible to defraud organisations, steal funds and 
then to evade detection, investigation, and arrest.  Australian police services have 
recently found an increase in such misrepresentations which have been used for 
money laundering and tax evasion, to obtain personal loans from banks, enter into 
hire-purchase agreements, and deal in stolen motor vehicles.  Often counterfeit 
documents have been created by a single person to support multiple identities, each 
being used once only for a specific illegal enterprise, and then discarded.  
 
We documented a case a man recently convicted in Melbourne for manipulating 
identities, opening accounts, forging documents to obtain drivers licences, moving 
money which was not his, establishing companies, setting up payrolls, getting tax 
returns  -  he made half a million dollars fairly easily.  But he got caught!  There is 
another case we use in which a Japanese man used the Internet to advertise the 
availability of bank accounts he had opened using false identities.  He allegedly sold 
the bank accounts through the Internet to enable his customers to use the accounts to 
perpetrate fraud and other crimes 
 
The technology of the Internet makes it relatively simple for users to disguise their 
identities.  Electronic mail and Internet addresses may be manipulated by including 
details which are misleading or the source of a message may be made anonymous or 
changed so that it appears to be coming from another user.  Similarly, there is no way 
of knowing the commercial affiliations of those on the Internet.  Referees for 
businesses or products might, in fact, be individuals employed specifically to indicate 
their approval of the venture or product in question. 
 
Businesses might also choose legitimate-sounding names in order to improve their 
credibility or include domain names which are misleading.  There has recently 
developed a practice in the United States and Canada of some businesses adopting 
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domain names containing the names of Australian cities in order to improve their 
marketability and credibility, despite the fact that they have no connection at all with 
Australia. 
 
In one case investigated by the ACCC, an Internet trader used the same domain name 
as another trader (the original bearer of the name), but with a <.com> suffix, as 
opposed to the <.net> suffix of the original site.  The confusion created as to the 
identity of the actual proprietor of the site allowed consumers to be misled or 
deceived.  The <.com> site did, however, include an inconspicuous notice stating that 
the site should not be confused with the <.net> site of the same name, although this 
could easily have been overlooked by those visiting the site.   
 
 
We can deal with all crimes, including fraud, by following the three principal tenets of 
situational crime prevention: 
 
 Increasing the effort 
 Increasing the risks 
 Reducing the rewards 
 
But, first of all we need to have good information, or at least an inkling of what might 
be going wrong. 
 
There are certainly some risk factors, and some red flags. 
 
Always look for anomalies   -  when examining risk there are in essence, there are 
three types of anomalies to look out for, behavioural anomalies, statistical anomalies 
and organisational anomalies. 
 
Behavioural anomalies can be found in people suddenly changing their lifestyles, 
living beyond their means -  they might have come into a lot of money legitimately, 
but keep an eye out for behavioural anomalies. 
 
Statistical anomalies are when the numbers don’t look right,  expenses claims out of 
whack with past patterns, sudden changes in credit card bills, tax deductions out of 
proportion to income, insurance claims that bear no resemblance to a person’s 
lifestyles etc. 
 
Organisational anomalies are activities which diverge notably from best practice  -  
inadequate systems of communication within the organisation, lack of transparency to 
outside observers, the absence of financial control systems, the Board of Directors 
handpicked by the CEO., poor leadership, inflated financial targets, unrealistic 
incentive structures based on commissions are all risk signals. 
 
The absence of anomalies, however, does not mean the absence of fraud.   How, then 
should you respond to these risks?  Some of the solutions simply involve the 
application of conventional risk management strategies while others entail the 
adoption of new technological approaches, or reliance on traditional legal responses.  
There are, however, a number of challenges that managers face in responding to 
corporate fraud in the twenty-first century. 
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• Poor investment controls 
• Poor cheque control procedures 
• Failure to verify identification evidence 
• Failure to verify ownership of property 
• Failure to verify credit worthiness 




• Inadequate staff employment screening 
• Inadequate supervision of staff 




• Internal auditing risks 




• Inadequate computer access controls 
• Inadequate card security controls 




• Professional regulatory risks 
• Corporate regulatory risks 
• Non-compliance with legislative requirements 
 
(The paper from which these are taken is Y Sakurai & R. Smith “Identifying & 
Responding to Risks of Serious Fraud in Australia and NZ”. Trends & Issues 
no 270 Australian Institute of Criminology,  2003, and it can be downloaded 
from www.aic.gov.au.  It also details a range of countervailing strategies to 
prevent or mitigate all of these.) 
 
You will remember that at the outset, I said the three main preventive strategies were 
to  
• Reduce the supply of motivated offenders 
• Protect and educate the suitable targets 
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Let me outline four general preventive strategies that minimise risk: 
 
• Effective Corporate Governance 
• Fraud Control Policies 
• Personnel Monitoring 
• Computer Usage Monitoring 
 
 
Effective Corporate Governance 
In the first place it is important for those who manage agencies and companies to have 
a proper understanding of the risks that are present within their organisation.  This 
requires managers to know precisely how their business operates.  Often those in 
charge may not understand how their organisations function in sufficient detail to be 
fully aware of the risks of fraud that exist.  This is particularly the case with respect to 
information technologies.  In Ernst and Young’s survey of large organisations, for 
example, less than one third of the Australian respondents considered that their 
directors had a good overall understanding of their business for fraud prevention 
purposes.  
 
Although managers may not be able to understand the technicalities of all the 
computer software and hardware that their organisation makes use of, they should be 
in a position to understand the areas where fraud risks arise and instruct appropriately 
trained personnel to monitor these areas regularly. 
 
Fraud Control Policies 
It is also important for organisations to have clear and transparent fraud control 
policies in place.  These are necessary in the digital environment no less so than in the 
terrestrial world. 
 
Australian Standard No. AS 3806-98 Compliance Programs provides guidelines for 
both private and public sector organisations on the establishment, implementation and 
management of effective compliance programs.  The Standard also provides 
principles which organisations are able to use to identify and to remedy any 
deficiencies in their compliance with laws, industry codes and in-house company 
standards, and to develop processes for continuous improvement in risk management. 
 
Establishing principles on, for example, the ethical use of information technologies 
and how to respond to instances of fraud are essential in conducting a business of any 
kind, whether or not it makes use of electronic commerce. 
 
Of particular importance is the need to develop specific policies on computer security 
along with appropriate guidelines on reporting computer misuse and abuse. Policies 
need to deal with specific on-line behaviour of employees such as security of user 
authentication systems (e.g. passwords), access to and use of the computers for private 
purposes, personal use of electronic mail, downloading software, and the use of 
copyright material.  Principles also need to be established to ensure that those who 
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Personnel Monitoring 
There is also a need for organisations to be confident that the staff they are employing 
are reliable and trustworthy, as electronic fraud often involves confederates with 
inside knowledge of a company’s security and computer procedures.  The 
administration of modern technologically-based security systems involves a wide 
range of personnel—from those engaged in the manufacture of security devices to 
those who maintain sensitive information concerning passwords and account records.  
Each has the ability to make use of confidential information or facilities to commit 
fraud or, what is more likely to occur, to collude with people outside the organisation 
to perpetrate an offence. 
 
Preventing such activities requires an application of effective risk management 
procedures which extend from pre-employment screening of staff to regular 
monitoring of the workplace. 
Long-term employees who have acquired considerable knowledge of an 
organisation’s security procedures should be particularly monitored, as it is they who 
have the greatest knowledge of the opportunities for fraud which exist and the 
influence to carry them out.  
 
Caution is also needed when internal disputes develop. 
 
A case heard before the New South Wales District Court on 27 March 1998, for 
example, concerned an unsuccessful applicant for a position with an Internet Service 
Provider (ISP).  When he was refused the job he took revenge by illegally obtaining 
access to the company’s database of credit card holders and publishing details relating 
to 1,225 cardholders on the Internet as a demonstration of the security weaknesses of 
the company.  As a result, the business lost more than $A2 million and was forced to 
close its ISP activities. 
 
Computer Usage Monitoring 
Employees’ use of computers and their on-line activities can be monitored through the 
use of software which logs usage and allows managers to know, for example, whether 
staff have been using the Internet for non-work-related activities.  Ideally, agreed 
procedures and rules should be established which enable staff to know precisely the 
extent to which computers are able to be used for private activities, if at all.  If staff 
are permitted to make use of computers for private purposes, then procedures should 
be in place to protect privacy and confidentiality of communications, subject, of 
course, to employees obeying the law. 
 
Where certain on-line activities have been prohibited, it is possible to monitor the 
activities of staff, sometimes covertly such as through video surveillance or checking 
electronic mail and files transmitted through servers. 
 
Filtering software may also be used to prevent staff from engaging in certain 
behaviours.  ‘Surfwatch’, for example, can be customised to deny employees access to 
specified content.  When the employee requests a site, the software matches the user’s 
ID with the content allowable for the assigned category, then either loads the 
requested page, or advises the user that the request has been denied.  The software 
also logs denied requests for later inspection by management.   
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The use of computer software to monitor business activities also provides an effective 
means of detecting fraud and deterring individuals from acting illegally.  
 
 
The Consequences of Failure to Respond to Fraud within Organisations 
 
Where corporations have experienced electronic fraud, managers are faced with 
difficult choices as to how they should respond.  On the one hand, they may choose to 
‘exit’ the situation — and to dismiss the employee responsible, or cease doing 
business with the individual who perpetrated the offence. 
 
On the other hand, they may seek legal avenues of redress, either employing 
civil proceedings to recover compensation or criminal proceedings to punish 
the offender and to deter others from acting similarly. 
 
Many organisations prefer not to report crime to the authorities.  A survey of 
organisations victimised through fraud conducted by Deakin University found that 
fraud was not reported officially because the matter was not considered to be serious 
enough to warrant police attention, a fear of consumer backlash, bad publicity, 
inadequate proof, and a reluctance to devote time and resources to prosecuting the 
matter.  
 
The reasons for the reluctance to report fraud are often due to a fear of ‘sending good 
money after bad’ as experience may have shown that it will be impossible to recover 
losses successfully through legal avenues and that the time and resources which are 
required to report an incident officially and to assist in its prosecution simply do not 
justify the likely financial returns.  Prosecution may entail countless interviews with 
the police, extensive analysis of financial records, and lengthy involvement in court 
hearings for staff.  
 
The other disincentive to taking official action lies in the reluctance of organisations 
to publicise the fact of their victimisation through fear of losing business or damaging 
their commercial reputation in the marketplace.  Government agencies might also 
believe that adverse publicity may result in a loss of confidence in voters, whilst 
financial institutions might believe that publicity of security weaknesses might result 
in acts of repeat victimisation taking place using the same techniques as those being 
investigated. 
 
Finally, where crime has been committed by those in positions of responsibility 
within organisations, they may not wish to draw undue attention to their own illegal 
activities. 
 
Although some of these responses are understandable, failure to take action creates an 
undesirable atmosphere in the organisation indicating that fraud is tolerated.  It may 
also may result in the offender in question being able to re-offend, either in the same 
organisation or elsewhere.  Failure to report crime also means that new forms of crime 
do not receive publicity and thus others may be victimised in the same way.  Finally, 
if crime is not reported then it is not possible to gather statistics on the nature and 
extent of incidents that takes place. 
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Fraud is not going to go away.  The electronic systems used to conduct commercial 
transactions are changing rapidly, and considerable effort is being put into ensuring 
the security of digital transmissions which represent monetary value.  The 
opportunities for fraud are, however, substantial.  
 
The solution to corporate fraud will ultimately involve the adoption of a range of 
strategies both technological and strategic in which close cooperation will exist 
between all those involved in providing and using systems.  This includes 
telecommunications carriers and service providers, financial institutions, corporations, 
and individual users.  
 
Going back to my three opening points, reducing fraud involves  
 
• Reducing the supply of motivated offenders 
• Protecting and educating the suitable targets 
• Limiting opportunities by making the crime more difficult to commit 
 
 
⇒ To deal with the first objective, reducing the supply of motivated offenders, is a hard 
one because there has always been greed, and the traditional crime prevention 
activities of early intervention are not applicable.  People commit fraud without many 
of the usual risk or predictive factors.  We are dealing here with culture and ethics  -  
not something that comes in a five minute pep talk  It is here that things like effective 
corporate governance and ethical standards are central.   At the other end of the 
spectrum, but dealing with the same issue of reducing the supply of motivated 
offenders, judicial punishments also play a role.  Prison, which has few redeeming 
features, probably works better as a deterrent for fraud offenders than for many 
others.  Similarly, confiscating a fraudster’s home or car and requiring ill-gotten gains 
to be repaid over a lifetime are appropriate sanctions for white collar offenders. 
 
⇒ To deal with the second objective, protecting and educating the  targets of fraud is a 
crucial part of the prevention equation.  It involves a knowledgeable and informed 
public able to identify an offer which appears “too good to be true” as well as a 
mechanism for keeping new information flowing, at both an individual and 
organisational level.  This goes hand in hand with a fraud control policy. 
 
⇒ Limiting opportunities by making the crime more difficult to commit brings in the 
other side of the prevention equation, of control policies, computer usage monitoring, 
policing anomalies, corporate governance and professional regulatory procedures. 
The technologies of crime prevention are also of fundamental importance here. 
 
It all points to careful risk management.   Risk management and fraud prevention are 
clearly preferable to the use of prosecution and punishment. 
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The prevention and control of fraud are two of the great challenges for Australia in the 
years to come.  Success in dealing with fraud will enhance Australia’s business 
reputation, and reduce the personal hardship that fraud causes to countless victims 
each year. 
 
Most fraud in the twenty-first century is sophisticated in planning and execution.  
Fraud prevention also needs to be sophisticated, although, as a recent British Home 
Office publication notes, it’s ‘Not Rocket Science’!  Some aspects of fraud prevention 
may involve individuals in the community taking basic measures to protect 
themselves, such as by using the security measures that modern computing 
technologies have to offer in a sensible and thoughtful way—and not simply writing 
one’s password on one’s deskpad!  Other target hardening measures may require 
elaborate and complex planning in order to thwart the efforts of fraudsters fully 
trained in the operation and management of electronic business systems. 
 
Managers also need to take personal responsibility for dealing with fraud and for 
reporting it to the authorities.  This will not only help to inculcate an environment of 
honesty and openness within an organisation, but will enhance deterrent effects for 
other staff and enable the public generally to understand new areas of risk and 
security weaknesses.  Sweeping fraud under the carpet by dismissing untrustworthy 
employees, compounds the problem and creates an atmosphere of complacency within 
organisations.  At every available opportunity, a culture of compliance needs to be 
reinforced. 
 
In the end, fraud prevention and control require the concerted efforts of individuals 
working both within the public and private sectors who make use of the most up-to-
date and effective fraud control technologies.  When all else fails, an efficient legal 
system must also exist to detect, investigate, adjudicate, and sanction those who seek 
to obtain funds dishonestly.  There has been considerable progress in each of these 
aspects already and Australia is at the forefront of many innovative developments in 
fraud control. 
 
The challenge for the years to come lies in understanding how new forms of fraud are 
perpetrated and ensuring that those charged with preventing and dealing with fraud 
have adequate resources to do their work.  As in most areas of crime control, it is 
better to allocate resources in preventing crime than in seeking to deal with the 
consequences after the problem has arisen. 
 
 
